

## Joint Doctrine: New Pubs, Old Controversies

By MICHAEL LEURS

There have been many changes in doctrine since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) singularly responsible for "developing doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces." The following discussion treats some changes that have attracted the most attention within the Armed Forces.

### Fire Support Coordination Line

The significant change relating to fire support coordination lines (FSCL) in Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, is the requirement for forces attacking beyond the FSCL to "inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reactions to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground." Ground, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and maritime commanders are informed of Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)/Air Force operations beyond the FSCL by the Air Tasking Order (ATO). For ground commanders, the implication is that tactics or procedures for artillery or helicopter units to inform SOF and air components in a joint force about attacks beyond the FSCL will need to be developed and promulgated in appropriate publications. This work is just beginning.

### Areas of Responsibility

Discussions leading to the approval of Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and the latest draft of Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF), caused what some reckon is the joint equivalent of the statement by the first astronaut to set foot on the moon: "One small step for a man, a giant leap for mankind." The change is that only a

joint force commander (JFC) will have an area of responsibility (AOR). Army and other component commanders in the joint force no longer have AORs but areas of operation (AOs) instead. The intent of the change is to expand and enhance jointness by making clear that only a JFC has an area of responsibility because only a JFC is *responsible for* (and has authority over) all operations within an area assigned. In reality, this does not represent an actual change in doctrine—it only acknowledges jointness. In the past an Army component commander has not routinely been responsible for all SOF action or air strikes within the Army AO and this remains the case. A land component commander, for instance, has generally not requested nor been responsible for conducting the following categories of operations when they happened to be located in the land AO: SOF operations to destroy key national enemy command and control facilities and remove documents, or air strikes against strategic targets, naval targets, airfields, air defense system facilities, or logistic facilities such as aviation fuel pipelines. The land commander must be informed about such operations in the AO and will always control those which are short of the FSCL to minimize fratricide and other impacts on ground operations.

### Joint Force Air Component Commander

There are some recent changes associated with the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept and some lingering controversies. A CJCS paper entitled "A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts" that was approved in November 1992 contained a number of statements about JFACC. It reaffirmed guidance first

promulgated in the 1986 version of Joint Pub 3-01.2, *Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations*, that JFCs would normally designate JFACCs. Like all functional components, JFCs must specify the responsibilities of JFACCs. The Chairman provided guidance, saying that JFACCs are usually the *supported* commanders for counterair operations, attacks on strategic centers of gravity when air operations form the bulk of the strike capability, and overall interdiction efforts by JFCs (as well as circumstances when ground commanders are the supported commanders for interdiction operations). But it should be noted that according to the CJCS concept paper and Joint Pub 0-2, "The *supported commander* has the authority to exercise general direction which includes the designation of targets or objectives, timing, and duration of the supporting force." In fact, an important area articulated in Joint Pub 1 and developed in Joint Pub 3-0 is the notion of flexible, simultaneous assignments of various components in a joint force as *supported* (recipient) and *supporting* (provider).

Joint Pub 3-0 makes a clear distinction between forces available and apportionment. First, JFCs must decide how much of the air and other capabilities should be made available to JFACCs for tasking. This is a JFC decision reached in consultation with component commanders. Every component has to achieve objectives assigned by a JFC and simultaneously provide capabilities for the entire joint force. This principle—recognized in the Omnibus Agreement for Marine air sorties (see Joint Pub 3-01.2 or Joint Pub 0-2)—has application for all joint components. The Omnibus Agreement requires the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander to provide long-range interdiction and reconnaissance, and air

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defense aircraft sorties to a JFACC (support for the whole joint force) plus any sorties that may be in excess of MAGTF direct support needs (that is, sorties to accomplish assigned MAGTF objectives). This is of course a two-way street. If a MAGTF or other component commander determines that organic air cannot achieve assigned objectives, a JFC directs a JFACC (through apportionment decisions) to provide the sorties required to accomplish the assigned objectives.

Once there is an availability decision, an apportionment decision is made to determine how the capability made available to a JFACC will be used to support joint operations. Such weight of effort decisions are also made by JFCs; JFACCs make the apportionment recommendations. Joint Pub 3-0 expanded guidance on the categories of apportionment. It explains that JFCs normally apportion by *priority* or *percentage* of effort into geographic areas, against mission-type orders, or against categories *significant for the campaign*. The publication then lists typical categories such as strategic attack, interdiction, counterair, maritime support, and close air support.

Someone—frequently a member of the Navy or a marine—will periodically ask what the final “C” in JFACC really signifies: commander or coordinator? Based on the joint definition of the term, a coordinator cannot task but only ask (and the response may be no). Accordingly, the Joint Staff sticks to the interpretation of JFACC which originated in the JCS deliberations of 1986, namely, as having the authority to task and being considered a commander. JFACC authority over service assets is normally limited to tactical control (TACON) or support relationships.

## Interdiction

The Army and Air Force have been working on doctrine for interdiction since the term was first used to describe attacks to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy surface potential before it can oppose friendly

forces. The Army has long felt that since ground commanders best understand how attacks on an enemy (especially those with a near-term effect) will affect planned ground operations, the ground commander should help determine interdiction targeting. NATO ground commanders came to the same conclusion and invented the category of battle-field air interdiction (BAI), which was incorporated into Army and Air Force doctrine. BAI was recently deleted from Air Force doctrine and it has never been recognized in joint doctrine. Other concepts for using interdiction also emerged over the years and include:

- ▼ attacks against the enemy logistic system
- ▼ attacks against key forces—that is, follow-on forces attack (FOFA)
- ▼ attacks against key operational capabilities (field command and control, NBC, et al.)
- ▼ synchronizing interdiction and maneuver
- ▼ joint precision interdiction (attacks focused on specific enemy forces to achieve a given effect—normally to gain a mobility differential—during a particular time frame with emphasis on attacks using real- and near-real-time intelligence).

Implementing these concepts has been fraught with controversy, partly due to differences in culture between air and ground commanders as well as to practical problems. For example, exactly where BAI started and ended was at issue. When was an aircraft performing close air support versus regular interdiction? Which related to who controlled what the aircraft did? Generally, the Air Force received multiple, independently prioritized target lists with very specific coordinates for movable targets. Air officers were disturbed to discover numerous cases where target coordinates had been based on intelligence older than that available to the air commander and where some targets had already been struck (although unknown to the Army staff or commander). Multiple, independently prioritized targets had to be merged into one prioritized list that ensured the highest priorities were struck

first since the number of targets is always greater than the number of strikes available. The question of who should be responsible for merging lists can be contentious (the air or ground component or the JFC's staff?). In many situations, especially early in conflicts, the availability of surface-to-air missile (SAM) suppression assets or fighters to achieve local air superiority meant that only certain portions of the AOR could be sanitized at a particular time. This permits attacks on interdiction targets only in a particular area regardless of the target priority.

A new interdiction tool for JFCs was promulgated in the CJCS paper and Joint Pub 3-0. These documents acknowledged that

*land and naval commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their near-term operations [and] accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect normally supports the maneuver to enable the land or naval commander to achieve the joint force commander's objectives.*

The document stipulates that JFCs may establish operational boundaries (lateral, rear, and forward) and within these boundaries

*the land or naval operational force commander will be designated the supported commander and will be responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction through target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations.*

The CJCS paper goes on to say:

*In addition to normal target nomination procedures, the [JFC] will establish procedures through which the land or naval force commander can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to strike with organic assets within their boundaries which could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified individually or by category, specified geographically, and/or tied to desired effects and time periods. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow the [JFC] to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by land or naval forces.*



# IN BRIEF

Details on this latest tool for interdiction and other issues concerning interdiction operations are being developed. The joint doctrine community is wrestling with this topic in Joint Pub 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations*, which is unlikely to be approved until sometime in early 1995. It will also be interesting to see if this publication addresses an interdiction problem noted by some during the Gulf War, namely, the need for timely and sufficient feedback from a JFACC to other component commanders on interdiction effects achieved by airpower.

## Army Helicopters and Close Air Support

CJCS fundamentally altered the traditional view of close air support (CAS) by stating that Army helicopters perform CAS in his *Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States* of 1993. It is now a primary function of the Army to "provide rotary-wing CAS for land operations" and, collaterally, "naval campaigns and amphibious operations." The joint doctrine community is currently developing a single set of joint CAS tactics, techniques, and procedures for all service fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft that will be promulgated in Joint Pub 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CAS*. Changes to service doctrine needed for consistency should follow shortly after the joint publication is approved.

## Search and Rescue, and Combat Search and Rescue

Current guidance requires a CINC to establish a Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) in order to plan, coordinate, and task components in support of combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions in operations. Joint Pub 3-50.2, *Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue*, changes the name and purpose of the organization: the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) would plan, coordinate, and control selected search and rescue (SAR) and CSAR operations using forces made available by a JFC. This change in mission requires a change in authority. In certain instances the officer in

charge of JRCC is considered a JFC staff officer and in others a coordinator. Officers in charge of JSRC, however, will be regarded as commanders, specifically as functional component commanders. This responsibility will normally be delegated to component commanders who will be dual-hatted as JSRC commanders and who are likely to exercise only tactical control of available forces. This publication is in the approval process and could appear in late 1994.

## Combat Assessment Joint Pub 2-0,

*Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*, promulgated the new concept of combat assessment which includes but subordinates *battle damage assessment*. Combat assessment determines if target effects are accomplishing a JFC's campaign plan, and it is seen as the end of a

cycle that begins with the commander's guidance from which targets are developed, weaponized, and attacked. Combat assessment then analyzes an attack from two perspectives: its success and ability to create the effect that the campaign required. To make that determination, combat assessment is composed of battle damage assessment, munitions effects assessment, and a reattack recommendation.

## Chain of Command

There have traditionally been two parallel chains of command, one going from the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the CINCs and the other running through service secretaries and chiefs to the field and fleet, with the former being regarded as the *operational* chain of command. The Legal Counsel to the Chairman recently advised that the language used to

describe the chain of command in Joint Pub 0-2 should be adjusted to reflect the Goldwater-Nichols Act amendment to Title 10. Thus the current draft of Joint Pub 0-2 states there is only one chain of command: from the NCA to the CINCs. The authority of the service secretaries and chiefs is administrative



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control (ADCON) which is defined as a "channel of authority." This is intended to ensure that no one will mistakenly assume that a service secretary or chief has operational authority. Although the change is terminological—rather than a change in the underlying concept—there is likely to be resistance. For instance, some units do not fall within a CINC's chain of command (such as the Marine unit which provides helicopter support to the President and reports to the Commandant, and the similar organization found within the Air Force). Also, many of the authorities the service chiefs possess (such as ability to convene courts martial, issue permanent change of station orders, and promote) certainly give the appearance of some element of command. But until Joint Pub 0-2 is approved one should keep in mind that this new language is still subject to change.

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